Silent but Deadly: Reconstructing Undisclosed Security Vulnerabilities in Public Package Registries
Research shows that up to 50% of security fixes in open source repositories are committed silently — no CVE, no advisory, no changelog entry — and more than 10% have active exploits in the wild before anyone outside the project knows (Li & Paxson, CCS 2017; Dong et al., DSN 2025).
Traditional detection techniques like binary patch classifiers can tell you whether a patch is a security fix — but not what the vulnerability was or how to exploit it. Until now, reconstruction still required a skilled analyst and hours of work.
This all changes with the advent of Large Language Models. In this talk, we present Lacuna, a tool that diffs two versions of an npm, Maven, or PyPI package and runs a three-phase LLM pipeline to produce a full vulnerability reconstruction — attack scenario, CWE, CVSS vector — and determine whether it was ever disclosed.
In our testing, roughly one in six version bumps in popular packages contained undisclosed security fixes — including packages with tens of millions of weekly downloads. We found silent fixes for SSRF, prototype pollution patches described as a performance improvement, and a critical TLS bypass update with no changelog entry at all.
The uncomfortable implication: any attacker with enough tokens can turn a silent patch into a working exploit. Maintainers who have relied on quiet fixes to buy their users time need to reckon with that. When the window between patch and working exploit has collapsed to minutes, publishing an advisory is no longer optional. Without a CVE, your SBOM lists the dependency clean and your software composition analysis scan stays green. That raises a question the industry hasn't fully answered: should tools be analysing what actually changed between versions, not just what was disclosed?
Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/